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2 August 1960

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### CENTRAL

# INTELLIGEN

## BULLETIN



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	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN	
	2 August 1960	
	DAILY BRIEF	
	I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC	
	Ghana-USSR:/Nkrumah appears ready to negotiate a detailed Soviet offer of large-scale technical and economic assistance. Four senior Ghanaian representatives have gone to Moscow to discuss the offer, which was made in June. The	
	Soviet proposal, which includes a credit to Ghana, possibly amounting to \$280,000,000, was reportedly accepted "in principle" by the Ghanaian cabinet last month. Nkrumah is determined to implement various prestige and development projects for which Ghana's own resources are inadequate, and he is confident that he can be seen to	
	fident that he can contain bloc influence in Ghana.	
	II. ASIA-AFRICA	1
<i>*****</i> *******************************		
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	UAR-Tapline: The dispute between the UAR and the Trans-	


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	Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200280001-3	25X
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<b>.</b>	Libya: King Idris may soon make substantial changes in the Libyan cabinet, although no major foreign policy shift seems likely. Prime Minister Kubar, who has held his post since May 1957, has become increasingly frustrated by the King's refusal to delegate to him sufficient power to run the government effectively. Kubar is reported to have submitted his resignation.	oK 25X
25X1	Turkey: Leaders of Turkey's provisional regime, in conversations on 25 July with General Norstad, impressed him with what he termed their revolutionary zeal and vigor. General Gursel, in discussing the proposed forced military retirement program, said he believed the plan could be put on a voluntary basis if modest pensions were available. The Turkish leaders made no suggestion to Norstad that they might feel forced to seek the necessary funds for the retirement program from non-Western sources.	ηο 25X 7 25X
	2 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF ii	

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Ghana's President Nkrumah appears ready to negotiate details of large-scale technical and economic assistance from

the Soviet bloc.

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27 July three senior representatives of the Nkrumah regime departed for Moscow, where they were to be joined by the chairman of Ghana's Industrial Development Corporation, Ayeh-Kumi, who is a key figure in both the formulation and execution of Ghana's development program.

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mission is to undertake detailed discussions based on a draft assistance agreement offered by the USSR in June and accepted "in principle" by the Ghanaian cabinet last month. The Soviet proposal includes a credit to Ghana, possibly amounting to \$280,-000,000, and provides for a mixture of economically sound undertakings together with a number of projects designed to achieve immediate propaganda effect. The USSR would deliver equipment and materials and also furnish technical aid for some 28 different projects. Not included among these, apparently, is the Volta River hydroelectric-aluminum project in which Moscow reportedly also expressed an interest last June.

Nkrumah has been cautious in his dealings with the bloc since Ghana became independent in 1957 and has repeatedly expressed a preference for Western aid-especially in connection with the Volta project, for which Western financing now appears likely. However, his determination to implement rapidly a wide

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and costly variety of prestige and development programs has caused him to become more interested in possible bloc aid. He reportedly stated last month that Soviet economic and technical assistance would not result in any change in the political policies of Ghana or any other African state.

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### Changes Likely in Libyan Cabinet

King Idris may soon replace Prime Minister Kubar and other cabinet members, although no significant policy shift seems likely. Kubar, who also serves as foreign minister, has been prime minister since May 1957, continuing in that post through two major ministerial shake-ups. He has been essentially pro-Western, though a tough and persistent negotiator on the amount and type of US and British aid to Libya.

In the last few months he has been increasingly frustrated by the King's refusal to delegate to him sufficient power to run the government effectively. Certain of the King's palace advisers have sought to undermine Kubar whenever they could, and the provincial governors, responsible directly to Idris, have exercised authority in matters which clearly belong within the federal government's jurisdiction. Kubar recently told the American and British ambassadors of his intention to ask the King to relieve him of duty, or at least grant him a long holiday abroad. Since then Idris has sent a royal circular letter to all officials criticizing corruption in government--a move which Kubar considers an attack on his administration. King has also refused Kubar permission to take leave at this

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nation.

#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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